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FISHERIES: CANADA-UNITED STATES RECIPROCAL FISHERIES RELA-
TIONS UNDER THE INTERIM FISHERIES AGREEMENT OF 1978.
On June 2, 1978, Don Jamieson, Secretary of State for External Af-
fairs of Canada, released a statement concerning the difficulties en-
countered by the Canadian Government with respect to the enforce-
ment of the 1978 Canada-United States Fisheries Agreement on both
the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts. I This provisional Interim Agreement2 was
designed to sustain the traditional fishing rights of the two countries until a
long-term pact could be worked out. A statement in response released
the same day by the Department of State of the United States- main-
tained that the effect of the Canadian statement was that Canada no
longer recognized provisional enforcement of the 1978 Interim Agree-
ment. The American statement further stipulated that the United
States had no choice but to reciprocate with similar repudiation of the
Agreement.
Interim fisheries agreements, like the one discussed here, have been
a natural outgrowth of the Fishery Conversation and Management Act
of 1976, enacted by the United States Congress on April 13, 1976. 4
This Act sought to constrain the rapid escalation during the late 1950's
and early 1960's of large mechanized fishing fleets off the coasts of the
United States, specifically those fleets of foreign countries.5 As early as
I Canada/USA Fisheries Relations, Statement by the Secretary of State for
External Affairs, Don Jamieson, Press Release, Canadian Embassy, Public Affairs Divi-
sion, June 2, 1978 [hereinafter cited as Statement by the Secretary of State for Exter-
nal Affairs].
2 Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of Canada [hereinafter cited as Reciprocal Fisheries
Agreement of 1978]. While the Agreement was to enter into force on April 11, 1978,
it currently is designated an unperfected agreement by the State Department library
due to the abrogation herein discussed.
' OCEANS: USA/Canada Interim Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement, Department
Statement, 78 DEP'T STATE BULL. 38 (August 1978).
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265,
§ 104, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as
Fishery Conservation and Management Act]. For a comprehensive treatment of the
Act and its effect on pre-existing fishing agreements, see Note, 10 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 703, 734-36 (1978).
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act prohibits foreign fishing
within the prescribed fishery zones without authorization through an international
bilateral fishery agreement entered into with the United States Secretary of State,
Fishery Conservation and Management Act, §§ 201-205, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1821-25 (1976).
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1955 there were over eighteen other countries taking a substantial
share of the catch from both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, some
fleets coming from such prosperous fishing regions as Norway, Japan
and Italy.6 The Act also was a response to the comparatively low rate
of increase between 1950 and 1969 of the United States share of total
world catch of fish products. It was estimated that during those years,
while the total world production increased from twenty million metric
tons to sixty-three million metric tons, the American share of that
catch remained relatively stable at approximately two million metric
tons.7 Yet, the United States imports of fish products during those
same years increased by approximately four times to meet the ever in-
creasing demands for an alternative to rising meat prices.' At the same
time, other nations with large and efficient fleets (many subsidized and
carrying the most technologically advanced equipment) experienced
substantial increases in production and decreases in total imports. 9
Thus, while the United States catch of fish from its own waters re-
mained stable or declined relative to other countries' catches from
these waters, and the demand for fish products in the United States in-
creased in dramatic proportions, foreign efforts and subsequent
rewards increased substantially, often resulting in instances of imports
by the United States of its own fish products. This situation also
resulted in the overfishing of at least ten major American commercial
stocks,' 0 resulting in serious economic consequences in the American
fishing industry.
6 Other nations fishing the United States coasts at the same time included
Poland, Russia, Germany, China, France, Spain, Korea, Mexico, Ireland, Romania
and Bulgaria. A typical example of this monumental increase was the Soviet Union
fishing enterprise in the New England Fishing Grounds. In the late 1950's, the Georges
Bank Fishing Area was used almost exclusively by American fishermen. In 1961, Soviet
fishing vessels reported taking 68,000 metric tons of fish (including shell weight) from
the Georges Bank Area. By 1965, Soviet exploitation had expanded south to the
Chesapeake Bay, with a reported catch of over a half-million metric tons, far in excess
of the American catch. By 1970, total foreign fishing catch in this region was well over
one million metric tons, with the Soviet take estimated at 75 percent of that total. By 1972
the American share of the total catch in that area had been reduced to 49.1 percent. See
H.R. REP. No. 445, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-43 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 593, 604-10.
' Id. at 35, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG., & AD. NEWS 593, 604-10.
8 U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FISHERY STATISTICS OF THE U.S. (Pub. Nos. 44-57).
9 H.R. REP. No. 445, supra note 6, at 37.
10 Id. at 36.
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It therefore became apparent that it was in the best interests of the
United States to seek a balanced concord that could protect American
coastal stocks, distant water fishermen, and the conservation and
management of all fishing resources from indiscriminate use by both
foreign and national interests. This included as a matter of policy and
law the American interests off the coasts of other countries as well. In
the words of Rozanne L. Ridgway, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Oceans and Fisheries:
While foreign fishing has always been a part of our life, the arrival
on the fishing grounds of modern technology gave a new dimen-
sion-a conservation dimension-to the challenge. The need to
preserve opportunites for our own fishermen and protect our
resources combined to make fisheries and coasts central. to the
negotiations toward a new law of the sea. The same need led to the
enactment of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act ....
These goals were very much on our minds as we embarked upon the
international negotiations required by the passage of the [Fishery
Conservation and Management] Act.
These negotiations had begun on April 13, 1976, not only with
Canada, but also with Poland, the Republic of China, the Soviet
Union, Bulgaria and Korea.' 2 Title II, § 201(c) of the Act enabled
such negotiations to be conducted pursuant to the establishment of in-
ternational fishery agreements.'"
The first of these international fishery agreements 4 to be enacted
with Canada by virtue of the Fishery Conservation and Management
1 Department Reviews Developments in International Fisheries Policy, Statement
by Rozanne L. Ridgway, 77 DEP'T STATE BULL. 175-76 (Feb. 1977) (made before the
Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on Feb. 3, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Statement by Assistant Secre-
tary Ridgway].
12 Id.
11 Fishery Conservation and Management Act, supra note 4, § 201, 16 U.S.C. §
1822 (1976).
14 Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement between the Government of the United States
and the Government of Canada, 28 U.S.T. 5571, T.I.A.S. No. 8648 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement, 1977]. A similar treaty was
enacted with Canada in 1973, apparently on its own momentum. Agreement on
Reciprocal Fishing Privileges in Certain Areas off the Coasts of the United States and
Canada, 24 U.S.T. 1729, T.I.A.S. No. 7676 (June 15, 1973) [hereinafter cited as
Agreement on Reciprocal Fishing, 1973]. This Treaty was superceded by the 1977
Agreement.
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Act was signed in 1977 and established that both governments have ex-
tended their exclusive fishery jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.' 5
Also established was the importance of the two countries' previous rela-
tionship under the Reciprocal Agreement of 1973 and the Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act of 1976. Article I states that these
waters will be identical to those zones described in a similar 1973
treaty,1 6 and that catch levels will be construed to refer to quantities
during the entire calendar year 1977.17 Articles II and III refer to the
provisional agreement of both countries to allowing fishing in those ex-
clusive areas of the other country, with the exceptions of any species of
lobster, clam, crab or herring on the Atlantic coast, and any species of
clam, scallop, crab or herring on the Pacific coast. Catches of rockfish
,and black cod are allocated differentially to each country with regard
to the Pacific Marine Fisheries Commission Groundfish Statistical
Areas in article IV. Article V prohibits salmon fishing by nationals and
vessels of either country in the zone of the other, except by trolling
within a three to twelve nautical mile range west of a line joining
Bonilla Point and Tatoosh Island south to latitude 48 degrees 00.3
minutes North, longitude 124 degrees 43.3 minutes West, and north to
latitude 29.7 minutes North, longitude 125 degrees 00.7 minutes West,
and otherwise within 12 nautical miles off the coast.'" This provision
also allows each country to limit such salmon fishing in their respective
zones to specified open times periods in order that conservation of the
species might be maintained.' 9 Article VI continues to recognize the
importance of the salmon fishing industry by offering bilateral con-
sultation with regard to chinook and chum salmon in the Washington
State and British Columbia Statistical Areas. This article also carefully
designates that each country shall respect the prohibited fishing days
for salmon (those determined in accordance with article V) according
11 Reciprocal Fishery Agreement, 1977, note 14 supra. This jurisdiction had
previously been limited to only twelve miles for the entire length of the coastal jurisdic-
tion. Agreement on Reciprocal Fishing, 1973, note 14 supra.
"1 Agreement on Reciprocal Fishing, 1973, note 14 supra.
11 U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FISHERY STATISTICS OF THE U.S. (1977).
18 This is located roughly off the Strait of Juan de Fuca, between Vancouver
Island and Washington -state.
19 The United States later chose from April 15 to June 14 as the specific time
periods due to the dense schools of spawning salmon traveling in the area during those
times.
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to the needs and conservation interests of the other country.20 Article
VII states that each country shall continue tuna fishing as previously
agreed upon and expand the scientific basis for international coopera-
tion in the conservation of that species. The remaining articles specify
the means by which the agreements are to be enforced, most impor-
tantly, by the recognition of the domestic law of the jurisdiction in
which the fishery lies.
The Interim Agreement of 197821 was basically a continuation of
the 1977 Agreement, which expired on December 31, 1977. There
were, however, two important areas in which the 1978 Agreement dif-
fered from the Agreement of 1977,22 and it was these areas that
became the subject of Mr. Jamieson's statement of June 2, 1978. These
modifications, concerning salmon fishing and consultation committees,
were seen as necessary especially by the United States since both
Canada and the United States were seriously considering extending
their respective fishery jurisdictions, and the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act had put the United States in the lead in the global
move toward coastal-state jurisdiction over fisheries. The tactical ad-
vantages of both the Act and the modifications were clear to the
United States, as stated by Assistant Secretary Ridgway in her speech
before the Senate Subcommittee:
Our act is the first of its kind, including as it does not only the sim-
ple extension of jurisdiction but new machinery for the exercise of
that jurisdiction. We are being closely watched by other nations as
they also move toward extended jurisdiction. . . . If these problems
[are difficulties between the United States and Canada over the 1977
agreement], rather than challenges to the integrity of the Act, some
solutions [are] . . . to shorten the period of congressional oversight
[ . . land] allow payments [for fishery privileges] to take place after
the issuance of the permits and the initiation of the fishery on March
1, [1977].2s
The first of these important modifications established two joint
consultative committees, one each for the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.
10 There was no language regarding how such needs were to be determined by
either country. As will be seen later, this resulted in the major area of controversy be-
tween the United States and Canada.
21 Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement of 1978, note 2 supra.
22 OCEANS: U.S./Canada Interim Fisheries Agreement, Statement by Am-
bassador Cutler, 78 DEP'T STATE BULL. 38 (August 1978) [hereinafter cited as State-
ment by the United States Ambassador to Canada].
21 Statement by Assistant Secretary Ridgway, note 11 supra.
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The second area which differed from the 1977 Agreement, and the
area which is now most disputed, was in the provision relating to
salmon trolling in the American zone off Washington State by Cana-
dian vessels. Under the revised terms included in the 1978 Agreement,
Canadian vessels were allowed to have on board only those salmon
which measured twenty-six inches or more in length, to insure against
the taking of undersized fish and thus threatening future salmon
catches in American waters. In return, Canadian vessels were allowed
to troll for salmon in the three-to-twelve mile range off the Pacific
coast considerably further south than was allowed in the past. 24
However, the extended fishing allowance was conditional upon the
Canadian Government's actions to close the Swiftsure Bank area off
British Columbia (Statistical Area 21) from April 15 to June 14, pro-
vided the need to do so was verified by environmental studies in-
dicating dangerously high capture rates of immature and spawning
salmon.2 5 This area was of concern to the United States due to the
heavy spawning schools that travel it on their way to the Pugent
Sound-Columbia River area during those specified times. The United
States wishes to protect the future of 'the species in these spawning
schools as ratified by the efforts of the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976.26
However, while Canada enjoyed the extended salmon trolling priv-
ileges granted in the new agreement, they did not close the specified
conservation areas off the Swiftsure Bank to their own fishermen, after
continued notices by the United States requesting them to do so. 27 The
United States then retaliated by notifying Canadian officials, the Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service and the Coast Guard that all Canadian
salmon trolling in the United States waters would be reduced to the
more restricted terms of the 1977 Interim Fisheries Agreement,28 thus
abating a major portion of Canada's anticipated catches, and resulting
in one of the provocations of Mr. Jamieson's statement and subsequent
actions on the part of Canada.
I This extension amounted to approximately 54 miles further south. Statement
by the. United States Ambassador to Canada, note 22 supra.
11 Again, no specific language regarding how such needs were to be determined
by either country was included. This resulted in the major area of controversy between
the United States and Canada.
26 Fishery Conservation and Management Act, supra note 4, § 2, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1801 (1976).
27 These notices were dated April 14 and 15, 1978. Statement by the United
States Ambassador to Canada, note 22 supra.
28 Id.
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The statement by Mr. Jamieson of June 2, 1978, revealed further
problems encountered by Canada regarding the Interim Agreement
that may have prompted Canada's contumacy of the salmon trolling
restrictions on the West coast. The Canadian Government viewed the
unrestricted fishing for scallop, pollock, haddock, and cod by the
United States off the Gulf of Maine and the Georges Bank area as ex-
cessive and unnecessary by the terms of the 1977 Agreement. 29 On
June 8, 1978, the Canadian Consulate 'released a background text ex-
plaining more fully its reasons for the partial suspension of the agree-
ment and the activity in the Swiftsure Bank area. 0 However, only scant
mention was made of the problems encountered on the Atlantic coast. The
background text explained that the Canadian Government was pre-
pared to close the specified fishery off the Swiftsure Bank as agreed,
but only if a conservation problem became apparent due to the high
incidence of spawning or immature salmon in the required survey catches.
While both countries had conducted separate statistical surveys, it was
never determined in the Interim Agreement whose survey data would
be used, or whose interpretation of a conservation problem would be
respected. As was stated in the background text:
To reflect these differing views, the agreement provides .... "If
the U.S. concludes that there is a conservation need to close the
fishery . . . but if Canada does not [so conclude], the U.S. shall have
no obligation to permit salmon fishing in its Pacific coast waters ...
[as provided in] the terms of the 1977 Reciprocal Fisheries Agree-
ment." While the final conclusion is left to the U.S. on this matter, it
was our [Canadian] position at the time of the agreement . . . that
the U.S. would not make its determination unilaterally and arbitrarily
but on a sound technological appraisal as to whether a conservation
need justifies the closure of the [Swiftsure Bank] fishery.3'
29 The net effect of this unrestricted fishing was a decline in the Canadian stocks
and adverse effects for Canadian fishermen. In June 1978, Canada expanded claims
to maritime jurisdiction in the Gulf of Maine beyond the area claimed as of November
1976, evidently to compensate for this loss. The United States indicated that this claim
was without merit and informed Canada of its formal rejection of the claim. Both
Canada and the United States denied each other access to these fishing grounds in
June 1978. These activities were conducted outside the scope of the interim agreements
due to the mutual abrogations. Canada/USA Fishery Relations, Press Release, United
States Embassy, Sept. 22, 1978 (copy on file at the offices of the Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law).
" Canada/USA Fisheries Relations, Press Release, Canadian Embassy, Public
Affairs Division, June 8, 1978 [hereinafter cited as Press Release, Canadian Embassy].
31 Id. While referring to the 1978 Interim Fishery Agreement, the background
1979
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The background text states further that a preseason test fishery was
conducted by Canada to determine the incidence of immature and
spawning salmon caught in the fishery, and that on the basis of the
data collected, Canada acted to prevent the opening of the inshore
one-quarter of the Bank to protect the conservation efforts of the
United States. It was in this area only that the test revealed a high in-
cidence of immature salmon. "[T]he preseason test, fishery showed the
incidence of immature salmon to be significantly higher [there] than in
offshore waters. We allowed the remaining area of Swiftsure Bank to
open as usual on April 15. '"32 Canadian officials continued to monitor
the fishery on the offshore part of the Bank, and inform the United
States of the results.
The background text further stated that when the United States
was questioned by Canada regarding reasons for the otherwise abrupt
abrogation of Canada's fishing rights off the Swiftsure Bank, no reply
was offered.33 At that time Canada offered to close the balance of the
Swiftsure Bank area on April 28, to provide time for the negotiations
needed to determine the mutual conservation efforts and needs of both
countries.3 4 However, the United States indicated that a definite con-
servation problem existed as shown by their own tests, and that since
the Bank was not closed on April 15, the favorable terms of the 1978
Agreement would be denied .3 Meanwhile, the Swiftsure Bank area
was completely closed to fishing by the Canadian government, evidently
as a goodwill gesture.3 6 Both the background text and Mr. Jamieson's
statement concluded with an invitation to continue negotiations with
regard to this and other Interim Agreement difficulties.3 7
text was attempting to delineate differences arising between the United States and
Canada regarding the determination of conservation needs and goals. Presumably, this
was the first interpretation, albeit unilateral, of the requirements for conservation needs
and interests specified in article VI of the 1977 Agreement. See also notes 20 and 25 supra.
32 Id.
11 Press Release, Canadian Embassy, note 30 supra. Evidently, the notices of
April 14 and 15 were ineffective in informing Canada of these reasons. See note 27
supra.
34 These negotiations began on April 12, 1978, and continued on May 11-12,
and again on May 26, apparently with no successful resolution. See also note 37 infra.
31 Statement by the United States Ambassador to Canada, note 22 supra.
31 Press Release, Canadian Embassy, note 30 supra.
17 At the time this writing went to press it was reported that the United States
and Canada had reached a partial settlement over the difficulties experienced on the
East Coast, especially those on the Georges Bank. The United States and Canadian
Governments indicated they will refer their border claims to third-party arbitration,
specifically the International Court of Justice. A spokesman said that reciprocal fishing
Vol. 11: 187
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The difficulties resulting from Mr. Jamieson's renouncement of the
1978 Interim Fisheries Agreement were further compounded by the
closing of the disputed areas off Maine and the Georges Bank to all
American fishermen.3 8 A press release by Mr. Jamieson on June 3,
1978, stated that while the Interim Agreement was designed to ex-
pedite matters until long-term pacts could be worked out, abrogation
of the Agreement was necessary due to the unusual circumstances.3 9
The release indicated that while no confrontation was expected over
the closure of the disputed Atlantic and Pacific coast fisheries, patrol
boats of the Canadian Coast Guard would be sent to those areas to
maintain the effects of the closure. The situation worsened throughout
the early part of June 1978, as the United States also prohibited Cana-
dian fishermen from the Great Lakes areas that had previously had no
such restrictions imposed. 40 Warnings were sent from the Coast Guards
of both countries, and the possibility of heavy fines and confiscations
of boat and catch were imposed on potential Canadian offenders.
Although very little commercial fishing was conducted by Canada in
the Great Lakes, Canada had no choice in the matter but to ban
American fishermen from Canadian Great Lakes waters. These bans
worked effectively for both sides, although there was a dispute over
whether sport fishermen were likewise banned from the Great Lakes. 4'
Canada, in order to maintain their excellent sport fishing business
from the United States, denied that sport fishing was restricted in any
of the disputed areas. 42 Talks concerning all aspects of the dispute
were to resume on June 19, 1978, but no significant progress was
can resume on the Atlantic coast as soon as the accord is ratified by the United States
Congress. The Atlantic coast accord establishes a management regime for all 28 fish
stocks of mutual interest to the fisherman of both countries. Shares for all 28 fish
stocks have been established, subject to review every ten years. Canadian External
Affairs Minister, Don Jamieson, indicated that he anticipated the same resolution for
the difficulties on the Pacific coast, but informed sources predict that reciprocal
fishing for halibut and cod will be phased out by 1980, with the same result following
for salmon fishing. Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1979, at 6, col. 3.
8 Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, note 1 supra.
'9 Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 3, 1978, at 4, col. 2. See note 29 supra.
40 Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 4, 1978, at 3, col. 1.
41 Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 5, 1978, at 3, col. 1; id., June 6, 1978, at 10,
col. 1; Cleveland Press, June 6, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
12 USA Sports Fishermen Welcome to Canada, Statement by the Honourable
Jack H. Horner, Ministry of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Press Release, Canadian
Embassy, Public Affairs Division, June 7, 1978.
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reported. However, in a statement by Ambassador Cutler of Canada
regarding the progress of the negotiations for the 1979 Interim Agree-
ment, it seemed that Canada expected substantial progress to occur in
the remaining months of 1978. Ambassador Cutler also urged that
prompt and favorable consideration be given by the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation to conclude the 1979
Agreement in full effect. 43
The major issue that will confront the United States and Canada in
the formation of the interim agreements and play and important role
in determining the status of any long-term pact is that of commercial
species management and conservation. The need for such an effort is
obvious to both countries. Yet for equally obvious reasons both coun-
tries are reluctant to forfeit their market for the sake of conservation
when the need for fish products has met a strong resurgence in an
economy of otherwise fluctuating food demands and inflation-ridden
prices. However, these problems must be overcome to avert total ex-
tinction of valuable commercial species, and they must be overcome
soon. It remains to be seen whether the United States and Canada will
adhere to their new bilateral declarations, or what effects those
agreements will have on the progress toward a long-term agreement on
reciprocal fisheries, or how extensive a role such interim agreements
may assume in future pacts, and how closely each country will adhere
to the provisions of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act. It
does seem clear, however, that both countries are deeply concerned
with the situation and the difficulties inherent in reaching a long-term
agreement. Substantial progress can only be made by open-ended and
realistic negotiations.
James T. Ball*
43 Statement by the United States Ambassador to Canada, note 22 supra.
* J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University, 1981.
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